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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
LABOR LAW - APPROPRIATE UNIT FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING-
SEVERANCE OF DEPARTMENTAL UNITS
Petitioning union, traditionally a craft organization, sought
to sever from an existing production and maintenance unit a
group of semi-skilled and unskilled employees, together with a
group of craft employees, to form a departmental unit of the
employer's forge die shop. Held, the rule established in the
American Potash and Chemical Corp.1 decision is controlling.
Under that rule (1) the unit sought is appropriate for severance,
and, (2) although petitioner is a craft union, it is not for that
reason precluded from representing a severable unit of the em-
ployees in question on a departmental basis. General Motors
Corp., Chevrolet Muncie Division, 114 N.L.R. B. No. 11 (1955).
The American Potash decision represents the National Labor
Relation Board's most recent general recasting of its policy on
craft and departmental severance. In that opinion, in addition
to defining the rules henceforth to be applied in craft severance
cases,2 the Board also discussed the question of severance on a
departmental basis. It recognized the equities of certain min-
ority groups, which "though lacking the hallmarks of craft
skills," are "functionally distinct departments" containing em-
ployees identified with "traditional trades or occupations" and
which have acquired "craft-like ' characteristics. '4 It recognized
also that certain unions had traditionally concerned themselves
with the special problems of such functionally distinct depart-
ments. Therefore, the Board ruled that it would allow severance
of departmental units, but would "require strict proof that (1)
the departmental group is functionally distinct and separate and
(2) the petitioner is a union which has traditionally devoted it-
self to serving the special interests of the type of employees in
question."' 5 The American Potash decision did not deal with a
1. 107 N.L.R.B. 1418 (1954).
2. For rules on craft severance, see id. at 1422-23.
3. The term "craft-like," as used by the Board in American Potash and Chem-
ical Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 1418 (1953), and Allis-Chalmers Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 719
(1948), 14 NLRB ANN. REP. 33 (1949), refers to departments which may contain
no true "craftsmen," measured by the Board in terms of the apprenticeable nature
of the particular occupation, American Potash and Chemical Corp., supra, Clayton
and Lambert Mfg. Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 540 (1955), but which are made up of em-
ployees who are required to exercise certain specialized non-craft activities, such
as truck driving, power house operation (see notes 8-10 infra), and which by cus-
tom have come to be recognized as distinct in relation to the remainder of the
employer's operation.
4. 107 N.L.R.B. 1424 (1954).
5. Ibid.
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new problem because for many years prior the Board had allowed
severance on a departmental basis. However, such severance
had usually been limited to two general types of cases. First,
the Board had allowed departmental severance in the so-called
"craft-nucleus" cases. Departments composed of both craft and
non-craft employees, and therefore not constituting a "pure craft
group," were permitted to sever "provided there was a suf-
ficient nucleus of skilled-craftsmen and the group" performed a
"specialized operation." In the second class of cases, severance
was permitted to homogeneous groups with a common interest
which, by custom or practice, had come to be regarded as "craft-
like" even though the members did "not possess craft skills."' 7
No "craft-nucleus" was required. Severance under the latter
rule was generally limited to such traditionally distinctive groups
as powerhouse operators,8 truckdrivers, 9 and foundry workers.10
On the other hand, severance under the "craft-nucleus" rule
does not appear to have been necessarily limited to groups of
traditional distinctiveness, the essential requirements being
merely a "sufficient nucleus of skilled craftsmen" and a "spe-
cialized operation." The status of these older criteria, in light of
the American Potash decision and a reconstituted Board,1 was
left in doubt. In outlining its new severance policies, the Board
had used limited language, making reference only to groups
which, "though lacking the hallmarks of craft skills," are "func-
tionally distinct" with "craft-like" characteristics and had gone
on to say that "the situations in which these circumstances exist
are strictly limited in character."'1 2 Consequently, it might well
have been speculated that this language spelled the quietus of
"craft-nucleus" severance, for the Board seemed to have had
reference to departments of the "traditionally distinct" variety.
Such a conclusion was lent substance by the fact that in Ameri-
can Potash the Board was dealing with and allowed severance to
a "traditionally distinct" unit of powerhouse workers.1
3
6. See 15 NLRB ANN. REP. 41-42 (1950) and cases cited therein; 16 NLRB
ANN. REP. 89 (1951) ; see Oregon Portland Cement Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 695 (1950).
7. See 15 NLRB ANN. REP. 41-42 (1950). In this report the Board clearly
recognizes that the two situations are distinct. However, in earlier reports, the two
types of cases appear to have been confused. 13 NLRB ANN. REP. 37, n. 7 (1948).
In 1949, the distinction is more clearly stated, 14 NLRB ANN. REP. 33 (1949), and
cases cited therein.
8. Croker, Burbank and Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 774 (1948).
9. Caskey Baking Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 374 (1948).
10. National Farm Machinery Cooperative, Inc., 88 N.L.R.B. 125 (1950).
11. The so-called "Eisenhower" Board.
12. 107 N.L.R.B. 1424 (1954).
13. Id. at 1425.
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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
In the instant case the Board, in construing the American
Potash rule, makes it apparent that departmental severance is
possible on a far broader basis than "traditionally distinctive-
ness." It is made clear that departments formerly severable
under the "craft-nucleus" rule continue to be severable under
the American Potash policy, with the additional feature that a
craft-nucleus is held to be merely a favorable circumstance,
rather than a sine qua non, to severance. The effect of the case
is to lend new significance to the departmental unit as a me-
dium for severance of a smaller group from the established bar-
gaining unit. The possibilities involved are well demonstrated
in two companion cases,'14 decided on the same day as the in-
stant case, involving the same parties, similar departments in
other divisions of the employer's organization, and essentially
identical fact situations. In both cases, the Board applied its
holdings in the instant case and, in one, allowed the petitioner,
the certified representative of a unit of 66 craft employees in the
employer's forge die shop, to extend its representation to a de-
partmental unit by severing 280 semi-skilled and unskilled em-
ployees of the die shop from the production and maintenance
unit represented by the intervening union. Thus, the Board ruled
that a craft union presently representing a craft unit, is not
for that reason precluded from severing the entire department
in which its craft unit is located.
Apparently at the present time the only deterrent to un-
limited severance of "functionally distinct" departmental units
is the American Potash requirement, reiterated in the instant
case, that the petitioner be a union "which has traditionally de-
voted itself to serving the interests of the employees in ques-
tion."'1 5 In the instant case, the Board did not make itself en-
tirely clear on this point. In holding the petitioner qualified to
represent the departmental unit sought, the Board found that
the petitioner had "traditionally represented the shop employees
either on a craft or departmental basis," and that "because the
unit was sought by a union which has traditionally . . . repre-
sented such employees on a departmental basis" the unit was
appropriate.' 6 This language raises the question of whether the
14. General Motors Corp., Oldsmobile Division, Forge Plant, Lansing, Mich.,
114 N.L.R.B. No. 54 (1955) ; General Motors Corp., Chevrolet Forge Plant,
Detroit, Mich., 114 N.L.R.B. No. 53 (1955).
15. 107 N.L.RB. 1424 (1954).
16. 114 N.L.R.B. No. 11, pp. 3-4 (1955).
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NOTES
Board has ruled that a petitioning union must have represented
the employees on a departmental basis in order to qualify to
sever such a unit. Or may such union qualify by having pre-
viously represented craft employees of the type to be included
in the departmental unit involved? If prior departmental repre-
sentation is a prerequisite, the effect would be to limit the pos-
sibilities of future departmental severance. But, if the answer
be that a union may qualify as well by having traditionally rep-
resented the department's skilled employees on a craft basis, the
number of unions which may qualify to sever "functionally dis-
tinct" departments is vastly increased.17
Daniel J. Shea
SALES - REAL ESTATE BROKERS - DUTY TO CONVEY
OFFERS TO CLIENTS
Defendant real estate firm was employed as agent to sell cer-
tain property. Plaintiff made several offers for the property
which were rejected by defendant but with the notation that
an offer of $9,500 would be acceptable. Although plaintiff there-
after submitted such an offer to defendant's salesman, the
latter, instead of communicating it to the owner, misrepresented
to him that another party's offer of $9,250 had been the highest.
As a result the property was sold for the lower offer. Plaintiff
sued the real estate firm and its salesman for the difference
between his offer of $9,500 and the price of $25,000 subsequently
asked for the property by the successful purchaser. The district
court sustained an exception of no cause of action on the theory
that no duty was owed to plaintiff by defendants. On appeal,
held, reversed. The statute regulating real estate brokerage im-
posed a duty on defendants to communicate plaintiff's offer of
$9,500 to the owner. Amato v. Latter and Blum, Inc., 227 La.
537, 79 So.2d 873 (1955).
The question presented by the instant case, whether a real
estate agent who has received an offer from a prospective pur-
chaser owes a duty to the latter to submit the offer to his prin-
17. In Friden Calculating Machine Co., and Marchant Calculators, Inc., 110
N.L.R.B. 1618 (1954), the Board held that in the case of a union newly organ-
ized for the specific purpose of representing the "craft" to be severed, the American
Potash requirement that the union seeking to sever the craft unit have a history
of representing the type of employees in question would not be applied. In all
probability the same rule would apply in the case of departmental severance.
19561
